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I. INTRODUCTION
The autumn of 2001 in the Northeastern
United States was unprecedented in terms of avia-
tion disasters. First came the mind-numbing
events of September 11, which kept the world
glued to its television sets for weeks. The story of
the four commercial aircraft that were hijacked
and ultimately flown into the World Trade Center
in New York City, the Pentagon in Arlington, Vir-
ginia, and an open field near Shanksville, Penn-
sylvania, shocked and mesmerized viewers every-
where.
The two Boeing 767 aircraft, American Airlines
("American") Flight 11 and United Airlines
("United") Flight 175, that were intentionally
flown by hijackers into the World Trade Center
began conflagrations so intense that the Cockpit
Voice Recorders ("CVRs") and Flight Data Re-
* The author is a retired airline captain.
1 See NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
("NTSB"), AVIATION: COCKPIT VOICE RECORDERS (CVR) AND
FLIGHT DATA RECORDERS (FDR), at http://www.NTSB.gov/
aviation/CVRFDR.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2002) [hereinaf-
ter COCKPIT VOICE RECORDERS AND FLIGHT DATA RECORDERS].
Cockpit voice recorders record voices and other audible
sounds within the cockpit, such as the noises generated by
turning a switch on or off or positioning a flap handle. These
sounds are captured by area microphones and the crew
members' individual microphones. Flight data recorders re-
cord performance and configuration information from an
aircraft's systems, such as airspeed, altitude, acceleration
(also referred to as "G forces"), aircraft fuselage angle (also
referred to as pitch), angle of bank, and flight control and
landing gear positions. Early models recorded as few as five
parameters. The current generation of FDRs, called Digital
Flight Data Recorders ("DFDRs"), are required to monitor
and record at least 28 key parameters. DFDRs are capable of
monitoring and capturing information from more than 300
other onboard sources. Thus, DFDRs provide investigators
with a wealth of data from which they can then reconstruct
an accident, often by using computer simulation. Id. While
FDRs, DFDRs and the information they produce are crucial
to modern accident reconstruction, they are beyond the
scope of this Comment and are mentioned here only to pro-
vide a more complete picture of the tools of accident investi-
corders ("FDRs"),' which are designed to with-
stand severe impacts and extreme temperatures,
were never recovered. The devices were presuma-
bly consumed in the flames and the subsequent
collapse of the Twin Towers. The recorders from
the wreck of American Flight 77, the Boeing 757
that crashed into the Pentagon, and United Flight
93, also a 757, that crashed in Pennsylvania, sur-
vived to provide investigators with some clues re-
garding the events on board the aircraft. Of the
two CVRs recovered, only Flight 93's was func-
tional after impact.
2
Next, on November 12, American Flight 587
crashed shortly after takeoff from New York's
John F. Kennedy Airport ('1FK"), killing 265 per-
sons. 3 The preliminary evidence showed that the
aircraft's vertical stabilizer 4 snapped off during or
shortly after an encounter with wake turbulence 5
from a Japan Airlines Boeing 747 aircraft that had
gation and reconstruction.
2 James O'Toole & Tom Gibb, Cockpit Tape Being Trans-
lated; Information Could Yield Key Clues to Flight 93, PrrFSBURGH
POsT-GAZErrE, Sept. 21, 2001, at Al.
3 See Marion C. Blakey, Opening Statement at the Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board Fit. 587 Press Conference
(Feb. 8, 2002), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/Speeches/
blakey/mcb020208.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2002) [hereinaf-
ter Blakey Opening Statement].
4 The vertical stabilizer is the large fin that rises upward
from the tail of an airplane to give the aircraft directional
stability. Typically, a rudder is attached to the trailing edge of
the vertical stabilizer. For more information on this and
other components of an aircraft, see NATIONAL AERONAUTICS
AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION ("NASA"), GLENN RESEARCH
CENTER, AIRPLANE PARTS DEFINITIONS, at http://www.grc.
nasa.gov/WWW/K-12/airplane/airplane.html (last visited
October 1, 2002).
5 See Advisory Circular, U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion and Federal Aviation Administration, Aircraft Wake Tur-
bulence, available at http://www.bayareapilot.com/waketur
bulence.htm (October 1, 1991) (last visited Apr. 17, 2002)
(explaining the concept of "wake turbulence," which is gen-
erated by every aircraft in flight).
Historically, when pilots encountered this wake in flight,
the disturbance was attributed to "prop wash," the swirl
of air trailing a propeller-driven aircraft caused by the
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taken off shortly before the American A300.15
While the first four crashes clearly were not acci-
dents, 7 the crash atJFK apparently was." Common
among these seemingly unrelated crashes is that
the recovered CVRs and FDRs play an important
part in the investigations that follow air disasters.1
A civil aircraft accident within the United States
is normally investigated by the National Transpor-
tation Safety Board ("NTSB" or "the Board")."'
When found, the recorders are taken to the NTSB
laboratory in Washington, D.C. for retrieval and
analysis of any information they may contain. If it
is determined that an airplane crash is the result
of a criminal act rather than an accident, as is the
case with the four crashes of September 11, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") becomes
the lead investigative body, with the NTSB provid-
ing technical support. I I While major accident in-
vestigations may take years to determine a cause,
useful information can bring about important rec-
ommendations early in the investigative process.
For example, after the crash of American Flight
587 in New York, enough information was ob-
tained from the investigation that on February 8,
corkscrew effect of its propeller. It is known, however,
that this disturbance is caused by a pair of counter rotat-
ing vortices trailing from the wing tips. The vortices
from large aircraft pose problems to encountering air-
craft. For instance, the wake of these aircraft can impose
rolling moments exceeding the roll control capability of
some aircraft. Further, turbulence generated within the
vortices, if encountered at close range, can damage air-
craft components and equipment and cause personal in-
juries. Id.
6 Press Release, NTSB, Update on NTSB Investigation
into Crash of American Airlines Flight 587 (Nov. 20, 2001),
available at http://www.NTSB.gov/Pressrel/2001/011120.
htm [hereinafter Press Release Flight 587].
7 Press Release, NTSB, NTSB Providing Technical Assis-
tance to FBI Investigation (Sept. 13, 2001), available at http:/
/www.NTSB.gov/Pressrel/2001/010913.htm TSB.gov/Press-
rel/2001/010913.htm [hereinafter NTSB Providing Techni-
cal Assistance to FBI Investigation] (stating that because the
crashes of the four airliners on September 11, 2001 were
"criminal acts," the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI")
was named the "lead investigative agency" and was placed in
charge of "[releasing] all information on the progress of the
investigation").
8 See Press Release Flight 587, supra note 6 (stating that
after the Flight 587 crash, NTSB Chairman Marion C. Blakey
and FBI Director Robert Mueller remained in contact be-
cause the FBI was an "active participant in the investiga-
tion"). At the time of the press release, the NTSB had found
nothing to indicate that the crash of Flight 587 was "anything
other than an aviation accident." Id.
9 See Blakey Opening Statement, supra note 3 (explaining
that the "goal of... every [aircraft accident] investigation-
is to determine the cause of the accident and prevent its
2002, less than three months after the accident,
the NTSB issued a Safety Recommendation on pi-
lot training issues. The Safety Recommendation
noted that certain manipulations of rudder con-
trols may "produce loads higher than those re-
quired for certification and that may exceed the
structural capabilities of the aircraft."
1 2
In the aftermath of any commercial aircraft
crash, requests are typically made for detailed in-
formation from the recorders.' 3 These requests
come from a wide variety of interested parties in-
cluding the media, media watchdogs, sensation
seekers, family members of crash victims, and
plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys.' 4 But the
law, as reflected by federal regulations and court
decisions, dictates that access to the actual audio
output of the recorder, i.e., the recordings as op-
posed to their transcripts, will be very limited and
will only be given to those directly involved in the
crash investigations. Access to the actual record-
ings is limited because, as the original legislation
mandating CVRs states, the information is in-
tended solely for accident investigation pur-
poses. 15
reoccurrence").
1) See NTSB, ABOUT THE NTSB: HISTORY AND MISSION, at
http://www.ntsb.gov/AbtNTSB/history.htm (last visited
Apr. 17, 2002). The NTSB is an independent federal agency
responsible for investigating all civil aviation accidents and
major rail, highway, marine and pipeline accidents in the
United States. Id.
I' See 49 U.S.C. §1131(a)(2)(B) (2000). The statute
states that "[it] the Attorney General, in consultation with
the Chairman of the Board [of NTSB] determines and noti-
fies the Board that circumstances reasonably indicate that the
accident may have been caused by an intentional criminal
act, the Board shall relinquish investigative priority to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation." Id. See also NTSB, ABOUT
THE NTSB: THE INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS, at http://
www.NTSB.gov/AbtNTSB/invest.htm (last visited Apr. 17,
2002) (detailing the circumstances under which the NTSB
handles an investigation of an aviation accident).
12 See Safety Recommendation Letter from Marion C.
Blakey, Chairman of the NTSB, to Jane F. Garvey, Adninis-
trator of the Federal Aviation Administration (Feb. 8, 2002),
available at http://www.ntsb.gov/Recs/letters/2002/
A02_0102.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2002) (detailing NTSB
safety recommendations A-02-01 and A-02-02, which seek to
rectify inadequate pilot training concerning the "structural
certification requirements for the rudder and vertical stabi-
lizer on transport-category airplanes").
'3I See, e.g., Jonathan D. Silver, Flight 93 Black Box Under
Wraps, PrI-TSBURGH POsTr-GAZEIT, Nov. 4, 2001, at A9 (dis-
cussing the public's difficulties in gaining access to the
United Flight 93 FDR).
14 See id.
15 See Installation of Cockpit Voice Recorders in Large
Airplanes Used By An Air Carrier or a Commercial Operator,
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Beginning with the introduction of CVRs, there
has been an ongoing tension involving the gov-
ernment, air carriers, airline pilots, the press, and
the legal community regarding access to, and the
appropriate use of the audio tapes and transcripts
from the recorders. This Comment will outline
the history of the introduction of CVRs in the U.S.
civil air fleet as an aid to accident investigation,
including the acquiescence of airline pilots to the
invasion of their privacy in the interest of aviation
safety. Next, this Comment will describe the four
principal potential uses and abuses of the prod-
ucts of the recorders (recordings and their tran-
scripts) and trace some of the history of each.
This Comment then will explore the principal po-
sitions of the various constituencies, especially in
the context of applicable legislation and litiga-
tion. The Comment next addresses the current
state of equilibrium. While not living up to the
originally intended narrow use of CVR record-
ings, it nevertheless provides a bright line rule
limiting access to the recordings to very specific
and narrowly defined circumstances outside of ac-
cident investigation, which are guided by carefully
prescribed rules of discovery. The Comment will
point out that the information available in pub-
licly released transcripts should be adequate for
the needs of those outside the accident investiga-
tion arena, obviating the need to subpoena re-
cordings for what amounts to fishing expeditions.
The Comment will then discuss current issues and
initiatives affecting the future of aircraft flight re-
29 Fed. Reg. 8401 (July 3, 1964) [hereinafter Installation of
Cockpit Voice Recorders] (stating that the FAA's "only pur-
pose in requiring the recorded information is to assist in de-
termining the cause of accidents or occurrences" and that
the information is only to used in "connection with the inves-
tigation of accidents or occurrences").
16 See Jack Cook, Part I, Training Days, at http://
www.ajcockrell.com/history/jcookO1.htm (last visited Oct.
22, 2002). The instructor had a rubber tube known as a "gos-
port" that he could use to talk to the student. One end was
attached to the ear flap on the student's leather helmet, and
the other end was a small funnel into which the instructor
yelled. The student could not talk to the instructor; he could
only shake his head "yes" or "no." Communications between
instructor and student could have been lost because of the
noise from the engine and the rush of the wind through the
cockpit. Id.
17 See SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, NAVIGATION IN THE AIR,
at http://www.nasm.si.edu/galleries/gps/airnav.html (last
visited Apr. 17, 2002). The current generation of transport
aircraft use the satellite-based Global Positioning System
("GPS") for precise navigation. Id. See also U.S. NAVAL OBSER-
VATORY, NAVSTAR GPS OPERATIONS: USNO NAVSTAR
GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM, at http://tycho.usno.navy.mil/
corders, particularly an active proposal to man-
date cockpit video recorders in commercial air-
craft. Finally, this Comment will forecast that the
advent of cockpit video recorders will disturb the
delicate legal equilibrium that exists today, neces-
sitating continued vigilance by Congress and the
courts.
II. PROVIDING THE MISSING PIECES FOR
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATORS - A BRIEF
HISTORY
The earliest airplanes did not have an electrical
system, let alone a radio or recorders. If the air-
plane had more than one seat, communications
between the occupants occurred through either
hand signals or a "gosport," a rubber tube
through which an instructor pilot could talk to his
or her student.'" After electric generators were
developed for aircraft, radios and a never-ending
collection of technological gadgets followed,
which now include satellite-based navigation,'
7
satellite-based communications18 and digital data
links used for air-to-ground communications, 19
and the FDRs and CVRs that are the mainstay of
modern aircraft accident investigation followed.
Aircraft accident investigation has evolved from
cursory and ineffectual efforts to find the cause of
an accident2" to a very painstaking and technical
process involving investigators from a wide variety
of disciplines using sophisticated techniques and
technologies. 21 From the industry's early begin-
gpsinfo.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2002) (providing a techni-
cal description of GPS).
18 See EMS TECHNOLOGIES, INC., SATCOM, AERONAUTICAL
SOLUTIONS, at http://www.emssatcom.com/solutions/
s_aeronautical.asp (last visited Apr. 17, 2002) (providing
multiple links to one manufacturer's satellite communica-
tions products).
19 See, e.g., ARINC PRODUCTS & SERVICES, GLOBALINK
SERVICES, at http://www.arinc.coin/products/globalink/in-
dex.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2002). The data link services
used by airlines are used primarily to communicate with dis-
patchers and maintenance centers on operational and main-
tenance matters, as well as with automated services that pro-
vide weather and airport-related information. These data
links provide high speed, high capacity communications
without congesting traditional voice frequencies. Id.
20 See generally GEORGE E. HOPKINS, FLYING THE LINE: THE
FIRsT HALF CENTURY OF THE AIR LINE PILOrS ASSOCIATION 38-
41 (1982) [hereinafter HOPKINS] (describing early efforts in
aircraft accident investigation and the erratic results caused
by unsophisticated techniques and other shortcomings).
21 One need only compare an accident investigation re-
port from an earlier time with a contemporary report to see
the level of sophistication of modern technology and tech-
20031
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nings in the 1920s through the late 1950s, the
only way to ensure an onboard eyewitness account
of an aircraft accident was pilot survival. Without a
reliable observer, most accident reconstruction
was left to educated guesses and speculation..2 2
For instance, after World War II, there was a
string of speculative efforts to pin down the cause
of a series of accidents involving cargo compart-
ment fires in DC-6 aircraft. Consensus had been
building that these and other similar accidents in
this time frame all were due to pilot error.231 Acci-
dent investigators did not have enough informa-
tion to piece together what the root causes might
be. In October 1947, a United DC-6 became the
next victim of in-flight fire resulting in a crash
near Bryce Canyon, Utah. Before they died in the
crash, the pilots were able to communicate, via
their radio, enough detailed information about
what was happening aboard the aircraft for inves-
tigators to begin to piece together what was bring-
ing down so many of the new generation of pres-
surized aircraft.2 4 The next month, an American
DC-6 had a similar fire, but landed safely.2 5
Based on the information provided by the
doomed United crew and the information derived
from the wreckage in the United and American
incidents, accident investigators determined that
the problem was a design flaw in the fuel system.216
Under certain circumstances, when fuel was trans-
ferred between two particular fuel tanks, fuel
niques. Examples are the report of two DC-6 crashes in 1947,
which take up only 12 typewritten pages, and the report of
the crash of TWA Flight 800 in 1996, which is 425 pages long.
See CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION RE-
PORT: UNITED AIRLINES, INC., BRYCE CANYON, UTAH, OCr. 24,
1947, AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., GALLUP NEW MEXICO, Nov.
11, 1947, available at http://www.pr.erau.edu/-case/library/
reportsl/40.html (released Dec. 21, 1948) [hereinafter ACCI-
DENT REPORT, BRYCE CANYON]; NTSB, ACCIDENT INVESTIGA-
TION REPORT: IN-FLIGHT BREAKUP OVER THE ATLANTIC OCEAN
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES FLIGrr 800, BOEING 747-131, N93119,
NEAR EAST MORICHES, NEW YORK, JULY 17, 1996, at http://
www.ntsb.gov/ptLblictn/2000/AAR0003.pdf (released Aug.
23, 2000).
22 See generally HOPKINS, supra note 20.
23 See id. at 179-80.
24 Id. at 179.
25 Id. at 180.
26 Id. at 179.
27 Id.
28 See generally ACCIDENT REPORT, BRYCE CANYON, supra
note 21. The Civil Aeronautics Board ("CAB") was the prede-
cessor to the NTSB responsible for accident investigation and
safety promotion. These functions were transferred to the
NTSB at its creation in October 1966. The CAB was abol-
ished in 1985 in the wake of the deregulation of the airline
would enter the intake of the cabin heater, caus-
ing it to catch fire. 2 7 The investigators discovered
these deficiencies and also found that there were
no published crew procedures for fuel transfer
that could have prevented the fires. 28 As a result,
the Civil Aeronautics Administration2 9 grounded
all DC-6s 11 and brought about needed changes.
The radioed reports from the United crew and
the survival of the American crew were serendipi-
tous. Several aircraft, however, were lost before
the problem was found.-1
Many of those aircraft might not have been put
in harm's way had there been a CVR or a 21st cen-
tury FDR to record what really happened to the
downed aircraft, enabling a more timely identifi-
cation of the cause and, most importantly, a viable
fix. However, more than a decade passed before
FDRs were mandated in commercial aircraft, and
it was two decades before voice recorders were in-
troduced to provide the often crucial pieces to
the aircraft accident puzzle.
In response to the growing number of unsolved
aircraft accidents and the need for more informa-
tion to aid in accident investigations, the U.S. gov-
ernment first mandated FDRs in the late 1950s,
32
and by 1964, CVRs were required in "large air-
planes used by air carriers or commercial opera-
tors." The FAA's sole intent was to provide infor-
mation to aid aviation accident investigators in de-
termining the "cause and nature of the emer-
industry. See NATIONAL ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMINISTRATION,
RESEARCH RooM, RECORDS OF THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
[CAB], at http://www.archives.gov/researchroom/fed-
eralrecords-guide/civil-aeronautics-board-rgl97.html
(last visited Apr. 17, 2002).
29 See FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, A BRIEF HIS-
TORY OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION AND ITS PRED-
ECESSOR AGENCIES, available at http://wwwl.faagov/in-
dex.cfm/apa/1271/21194882-E4F (last visited Apr. 17,
2002). The Civil Aeronautics Administration ("CAA") was the
forerunner of today's Federal Aviation Administration
("FAA"). In the post-WWII era, the CAA was a branch of the
Department of Commerce and was responsible for air traffic
control, certification of pilots and aircraft, safety enforce-
ment, airway development and the administration of a finan-
cial assistance program designed to promote development of
civil airports. Id.
0 HOPKINS, supra note 20, at 180.
31 Id.
32 See George Hayllar, The Histoly of Flight Data Recorders
('I7)Rs), available at http://www.bath.ac.uk/-en8gkh/ghis-
tory.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2002).
'3 Installation of Cockpit Voice Recorders in Large Air-
planes Used by an Air Carrier or Commercial Operator, 29
Fed. Reg. at 8401.
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gency." 3 4 This intent was made even clearer just
prior to implementation:
The [FAA] agrees that its only purpose in requiring the
recorded information is to assist in determining the
cause of accidents or occurrences, and that the infor-
mation should be used only in connection with the in-
vestigation of accidents or occurrences ... and not in a
civil penalty or certificate action.
3 5
Cockpit voice recorders, often referred to as
"black boxes," 36 come in several versions, depend-
ing largely on their date of manufacture and the
FAA specifications at the time. Traditional CVRs
typically record continuously on a loop of mag-
netic tape beginning at the CVR's activation prior
to the checklists the pilot is required to go
through before engine start.3 7 It records informa-
tion via an overhead microphone ("cockpit area
microphone"), which captures voice conversation
as well as the ambient noises associated with the
movement of levers and switches, engines and
other airplane components. 38 It also collects in-
formation directly from the pilots' headsets so
that radio transmissions are included, and it col-
lects information from oxygen mask microphones
so that communications will not be lost while pi-
lots are using the masks. The tape typically can
hold 30 minutes of sound recording and, there-
fore, retains only the last 30 minutes or so prior to
the recorder being shut down-either by being
turned off or because power was lost for another
reason, such as a crash.3 9 The newest models in-
corporate digital technology, recording on mem-
34 Installation of Cockpit Voice Recorders in Large Air-
planes Used by an Air Carrier or Commercial Operator, 28
Fed. Reg. 13786 (Dec. 18, 1963) (explaining that a number
of accidents that at time were "characterized by sudden ex-
treme emergencies, so that the flight crew could not commu-
nicate with ground facilities. In those cases where the crew
did not survive, information they may have been able to give
concerning the cause and nature of the emergency was
lost").
35 Installation of Cockpit Voice Recorders in Large Air-
planes Used by an Air Carrier or Commercial Operator, 29
Fed. Reg. at 8401.
'36 "Black boxes" is a misnomer. To enable investigators
to locate CVRs and their companion FDRS more easily in air-
craft wreckage, they most commonly are painted bright or-
ange or, sometimes, bright yellow. See 14 C.F.R. §§23.1457,
1459 (2001).
37 14 C.F.R. §91.609 (2001).
38 See COCKPIT VOICE RECORDERS AND FLIGHT DATA RE-




42 One "G" is equal to the force exerted by gravity on a
body at rest. Christopher Hess, High-Tech Anti-G Suits, FLUG
ory chips instead of tape, and can hold two hours
of sound in digital format.
40
Cockpit voice recorders are built to withstand
incredible extremes of impact shock, temperature
and pressure. 4' The typical modern CVR must be
able to sustain an impact force of 3400 "G.
'"42
They must also be able to withstand a fire of 1100
degrees Celsius (2012 degrees Fahrenheit) for at
least 30 minutes and remain undamaged to a
depth of 20,000 feet underwater. The specifica-
tions also call for an underwater locator beacon
capable of operating continuously for 30 days.
43
III. THE TENSION - POTENTIAL USES FOR
CVR RECORDINGS
Along with the introduction of CVRs on U.S.
airliners, there also came four potential uses for
their output: (1) accident investigation; (2) public
airing by the media; (3) litigation; and (4) crimi-
nal investigation and prosecution. The first was an
intended use; the others were not.
A. Accident Investigation
The value of CVRs became apparent from the
beginning of their use. On December 20, 1967,
shortly after the mandate for CVR installation in
the domestic air fleet, 44 a Delta Airlines ("Delta")
DC-8 on a pilot training flight crashed during a
practice emergency approach that simulated two
REVUE ONLINE, at http://www.flug-revue.rotor.com/FRheft/
FRH9908/FR9908d.htm (last updated July 12, 1999) [herein-
after Hess]. For comparison, the typical airliner is limited to
about 2.5 G in flight; the most aggressive roller coasters exert
no more than about 4.5 G; an airplane occupant not accus-
tomed to "pulling G" and not wearing a g-suit will black out
at between 5 and 6 G; modern fighter aircraft are limited to
about 9 G; and a 160 pound driver crashing into an immova-
ble object at 30 miles per hour will sustain between 20 and 30
G, depending on whether the seatbelt he is wearing stretches
or not. See Unofficial Guide to Six bags Over Georgia, Roller Coast-
ers, at http://zuben77.tripod.com/unofficialguidetosixflag-
sovergeorgia/id2.html; Hess, supra; Jeff Ethell, Jeff Ethell's
Pireps-F-16 Falcon, at http://www.airspacemag.com/asm/
web/special/ethell/pirep6.htnl (last updated Apr. 20,
2001); HYPERPiHYSICS, FORCE ON DRIVER IN EXAMPLE CAR
CRASH, at http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/
carcr2.html (all last visited Apr. 17, 2002).
43 See COCKPIT VOICE RECORDERS AND FLIGHT DATA RE-
CORDERS, supra note 1.
44 See Installation of Cockpit Voice Recorders in Large
Airplanes Used by an Air Carrier or Commercial Operator,
29 Fed. Reg. at 8401. Cockpit Voice Recorders were required
to be installed in all large jets byJuly 1, 1966 and in all large,
pressurized four-engine airplanes by January 1, 1967. Id.
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inoperative engines. 45 Based primarily on the
cockpit conversations extracted from the newly in-
stalled CVRs, accident investigators were able to
conclude that two of the principal reasons for the
accident were "errors in judgment by the captain-
trainee and inadequate supervision and exercise
of command on the part of the instructor."4, This
is an example of the most basic type of analysis
expected to come from CVRs-being able to ana-
lyze both the words spoken by cockpit occupants
and the context in which they are spoken. In this
case, the trainee was a very experienced captain
being trained to qualify to operate a new aircraft
by another very experienced captain. 47 It was evi-
dent from the CVR recording that the training en-
vironment was relaxed, probably because the
trainee and the instructor were essentially equal.
48
This led the investigators to conclude that the in-
formal instructor-student relationship resulted in
a less attentive atmosphere than that which might
have prevailed had the trainee been less exper-
ienced.
49
The tones of the few suggestions given by the instructor
were in a mild prompting manner. There appeared to
be complete confidence in the student's ability to over-
come any problem, including the drastically reduced
airspeed. There was no apprehension manifest until
the captain-trainee himself recognized the loss of con-
trol, at which point the accident was inevitable.
5
0
Exactly a month before the Delta training acci-
dent, on November 20, 1967, a Trans World Air-
lines ("TWA") Convair 880 four-engine passenger
jet crashed during its approach to the Greater
Cincinnati Airport, located in Covington, Ken-
tucky.51 The investigation of this accident vividly
demonstrated that CVRs could produce more
than cockpit conversations. "In an effort to deter-
mine engine power used during the latter stages
45 See 14 C.F.R. §121.424 (2001). Much airline training is
now conducted in high fidelity aircraft flight simulators
tinder Appendix H to Federal Aviation Regulations Part 121
- Advanced Simulation, codified in 14 C.F.R. §121, app. H
(2001), not only to save money, but to avoid exposure to acci-
dents brought about by practicing emergency procedures in
real aircraft. For example, windshear training is so inherently
dangerous that it is required only in simulators. Id.
46 See NTSB, AIRCRAFr ACCIDENT REPORT: DELTA AIR-
LINES, INC. DC-8, N803E, KENNER, LOUISIANA, NTSB/AAR-67
AG, available at http://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/
AAR67-AG.pdf (released Dec. 20, 1967).




51 See NTSB, AIRCRAvI' ACCIIWFNT REPORT: TRANS WORLD
AIRLINES, INC., CONVAIR 880, N821TW, CONSTANCE, KEN-
of the flight.., the original CVR tape was pro-
vided to the engine manufacturer for an analysis
of engine-generated sound spectral frequency re-
lationships. Several prominent resonances were
detected on the accident CVR tape."5 2 Sophisti-
cated analysis contributed to a better understand-
ing of thrust requirements and thrust manage-
ment during the approach, demonstrating the
wealth of additional information which may be
available on a CVR tape.
NTSB investigators used a similar analysis of the
CVR tapes to help determine the likely cause of
the crash of Air Florida Flight 90 on January 13,
1982.53 The aircraft crashed into the 14th Street
Bridge across an ice-covered Potomac River im-
mediately after takeoff from Washington's Na-
tional Airport.54 Sound spectrum analysis of the
CVR tape allowed analysts to determinate that the
engines were not developing the thrust required
for takeoff. 5 5 This information promulgated fur-
ther tests at Boeing, the aircraft's manufacturer,
that demonstrated that the suspected icing of an
engine sensor, called an engine inlet probe, re-
sulted in an undetected reduced thrust in the
range that the spectrum analysis had indicated.
56
Combined with the conversations recorded on
the CVR, this critical information allowed investi-
gators to draw conclusions based on hard facts
rather than mere speculation.
5 7
Cockpit voice recorder tapes have also revealed
inadequacies in training and procedures. In 1974,
a TWA 727 crashed into a ridge near Round Hill,
Virginia in part because of a misinterpretation by
the pilots of air traffic control terminology. 58 As a
result, the FAA changed its relevant air traffic con-
TrUCiv, 18, available at http://Anelia.db.erau.edu/reports/
ntsb/aar/AAR69-05.pdf (released Nov. 20, 1967) [hereinaf-
ter AIRCRAFr ACCIDENT REPORT, TRANS WORLD AIRLINES].
52 See id. at 18.
53 See NTSB, AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT: AIR FLORIDA,
INC., BOEINc 737-222, N62AF, COLLISION WITH 14TH STREET
BRIDGE, NEAR WASHINGTON NATIONAL AIRPORT, WASHINGTON,
D.C., JAN. 13, 1982, available at http://www.airdisaster.com/
reports/ntsb/AAR82-08.pdf (released Aug. 10, 1982).
54 i. at 5.
55 Id. at 80.
56 See id. at 23.
57 See id.
58 See NTSB, AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT: TRANS WORLD
AIRLINES, INC., BOEING 727-231, N54328, BERinVILLE, VIR-
cINIA, DEC. 1, 1974, 1, available at http://ameilia.db.erau.




trol procedures. 59 2. Back Toward Original Intent.
1. Straying From Original Intent
Just as the requirement for installation of CVRs
became effective, Congress passed the Freedom
of Information Act ("FOIA") ,60 which made much
government-held information accessible to the
general public. In its original incarnation, the
FOIA envisioned a pro-disclosure bias by limiting
exemptions:
Nothing in this section authorizes withholding of infor-
mation or limiting the availability of records to the pub-
lic except as specifically stated in this section, nor shall
this section be authority to withhold information from
Congress.
6 1
This bias in favor of disclosure has been echoed
repeatedly in court opinions. 62 With the enact-
ment of the FOIA and increased interest on the
part of the media, the floodgates were opened. As
one commentator noted:
[T]he use of CVR information began to broaden be-
yond what was originally contemplated .... Portions of
CVR transcripts began appearing in the news media,
which resulted in premature speculation and misinfor-
mation as to the cause of the accident. Often the tran-
scripts that were published, while perhaps interesting
or sensational, had no relevance whatsoever to the acci-
dent. Such media stories often resulted in unwarranted
and unfair accusations being made against [those] in-
volved in the accident.6
In 1982, in response to this divergence from the
original intent for the use of CVR recordings,
Congress passed legislation intended to rein in
the abuses while ensuring that the public still had
access to pertinent information.
64
59 Id.
60 5 U.S.C. §552 (2000).
61 See S. Res. 1160, 89th Cong. (1966) (enacted), available
at http://gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/nsa/FOIA/FOIAACT66.pdf
(last visited Apr. 17, 2002).
62 See, e.g., Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Robbins, 437 U.S.
214, 220 (1978) (quoting Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S.
352, 361 (1976)) (stating that the FOIA's "'basic policy' is in
favor of disclosure").
63 James W. Johnson, Cockpit Voice Recorder: Solely For Acci-
dent Investigations, LITIGxION IN AVIATION, 1991, A.B.A. SEC.
TORT & INS. PRAc-r. & DIv. FOR PROF'L. EDUC., §C at 3 [here-
inafter Johnson].
64 Independent Safety Board Act Amendments of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-309, 96 Star. 1453 (1982) (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. §1905 (1990)). Title 49 has been par-
tially revised, placing CVR restrictions in a new section. The
current citation is 49 U.S.C. §1154 (2001).
65 See H.R. CONF. REP. 97-864, at 3 (1982), reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3042, 3043. This provision states:
[Tihe [NTSB] shall withhold from public disclosure
cockpit voice recorder recordings and transcriptions in-
The legislation, an amendment to a five-year ex-
tension of the Aviation Insurance Program
65
("war risk insurance program"), requires the
NTSB to withhold CVR recordings and transcripts
associated with ongoing accident investigations.
The NTSB is then required to make relevant por-
tions of the transcripts available to the public at the
Board's public hearing, but no later than 60 days
after the accident or after CVR recovery, which-
ever is later.66 The clear intent was to give the
NTSB an undisturbed 60-day window to assess the
contents of the CVR tapes before the "relevant
and pertinent" portions of the transcript are re-
leased to the public.
67
This legislation did not quell premature leaks
of transcripts or copies of the tapes themselves. In
1987, even before the NTSB's CVR group had its
first meeting,6 the New York Times published ex-
cerpts of CVR data from a Northwest Airlines acci-
dent in Detroit.69 In addition, at least one state
court made a CVR tape available through discov-
ery without placing a protective order on its use.
76
As a result, the tape, intended solely for use in ac-
cident investigations, found its way outside this
realm. In one of the more egregious misuses of a
CVR tape, a Texas state court ordered the release
of a tape through discovery. The tape ended up in
the hands of the local news media and was ulti-
mately picked-up and aired by the national affili-
ate.7
1
In the midst of this tug-of-war are the pilots.
Their conversations are recorded on the CVR
volving flight crew communications that are associated
with accidents investigated by the Board. The Board is
required to make available to the public those portions
of the transcriptions of such communications that the
Board deems relevant and pertinent to the accident, at
the time of the Board's public hearing on the accident,
and in any event no later than 60 days following the acci-
dent. In the event that the CVR is not recovered immedi-
ately after the accident, the conferees intend that the
Board have 60 days after recovery of the CVR before re-
lease. The conferees emphasize that this amendment
would not affect the Board's current practice of sharing
CVR information with parties to the investigation. Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 SeeJohnson, supra note 63, at 4.
69 See NTSB, NTSB ACCIDENT SUMMARY DCA87MA046:
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC. ACCIDENT ON JULY 16, 1987 AT
ROMULUS, MI, at http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev-id=
20001213X31759&key=l (released Aug. 1987).
70 SeeJohnson, supra note 63, at 4.
71 Id. at 5.
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tapes. While initially reluctant to become the sub-
jects of eavesdropping, pilots recognized the ben-
efits reaped in accident investigations and were
eventually won over with assurances that the CVR
tapes would be used solely for this purpose.72 As
early as 1969, the Executive Board of the Air Line
Pilots Association ("ALPA"), which represents the
majority of airline pilots in the United States, en-
dorsed the use of CVRs, with the proviso that their
use be limited to accident investigators. 73 At the
same time, ALPA continued to reaffirm "its long-
standing position in opposition to the use of air-
craft crash recorders and cockpit voice recorders
for purposes other than accident investigation.
74
In addition to Congress, the FAA, NTSB and a
majority of U.S. pilots, many in the international
aviation arena share this view. The International
Civil Aviation Organization ("ICAO") is a special-
ized agency of the United Nations,7 5 formed "to
secure international co-operation . . . [in the]
highest possible degree of uniformity in regula-
tions and standards, procedures and organization
regarding civil aviation matters. 7 6 The ICAO's
policy is that records, including specifically "cock-
pit voice recordings and transcripts from such re-
cordings," are not available "for purposes other
than accident or incident investigation, unless the
appropriate authority for the administration of
justice in that State determines that their disclo-
sure outweighs the adverse domestic and interna-
72 AIR LINE PILOTs ASSOCIATION, INT'L-ADMINISTRATIV],
MANUAL, SECTION 80-ENGINEERING AN) AIR SAFETY, 80-71
(October 2001).
73 Id.
74 Id. at 80-72.
75 See INTERNATIONAL CIviL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, CHI-
CAGO CONVENTION, at http://www.icao.int/cgi/goto.pl?icao/
en/history.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2002).
76 INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, FOUN-
DATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIl. AVIATION ORGANIZATION
(ICAO), at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/ro/eurnat/his-
tory02.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2002).
77 See ANNEX 13 TO TIE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL
AVIATION, AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATION
§5.12 (International Civil Aviation Organization, 9th ed.
2001).
78 The most recent differences were submitted by the
U.S. to reflect U.S. differences with the Ninth Edition of AN-
NEX 13 TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL AvIATION,
which became effective November 1, 2001. See Memorandum
to the Secretary General of the International Civil Aviation
Organization (Nov. 1, 2001) (on file with this author) (de-
lineating the differences between the Ninth Edition of AN-
NEX 13 TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL AVIATION and
specific U.S. regulations and practices).
79 See Capt. Paul McCarthy, Kiwis, CLOP, and the CVR, AIR
LINE PILOT, Jan. 2000, at 22. On June 6, 1995, an Ansett
tional impact such action may have on that or any
future investigations." 77 The United States has
filed "differences" to the ICAO policy to reflect
current U.S. law.
7 8
In New Zealand, in response to a successful po-
.lice warrant to seize the CVR from a 1995 aircraft
accident,79 the government enacted new law re-
flecting the ICAO policy by protecting products of
flight recorders and the privity of accident investi-
gations.80 The law limits use of recorders to acci-
dent investigations, prohibits their use in legal or
administrative proceedings and prevents their use
by the media.8 1 The legislation was forward look-
ing because it included emerging technologies
such as cockpit video recorders.8 2 Current U.S.
law proscribes a similar release of video record-
ings,8 even though video recorders are not yet re-
quired in cockpits.8 4 The International Federa-
tion of Air Line Pilot Associations ("IFALPA") also
endorses the use of CVRs under conditions very
much like those permitted in the U.S.
8 5
Why should the pilot's opinion matter? Why
should society need a pilot's "permission" to re-
cord their professional activities? The answer is
that CVRs, while serving a vital function when
used as intended, can also constitute an otherwise
unwarranted intrusion on an individual's expecta-
tion of privacy in the workplace. The Supreme
Court has held that even a public employee has "a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his office,"86
DHC-8 twin turboprop aircraft enroute to Palmerton North
on New Zealand's North Island crashed into a ridgeline dur-
ing an instrument approach while the pilots were
troubleshooting a malfunctioning landing gear. Four passen-
gers and the flight attendant were killed. At the same time
the New Zealand Government Transport Accident Investiga-
tion Commission was investigating the accident, the police
sought and obtained the CVR tape as part of an investigation
to determine if the pilots were criminally liable in the opera-
tion of the aircraft. At the time, CVRs were not even required
in New Zealand. Id.
80 1d.
81 Id.
82 See NEW ZEALAND AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, NEW
ZEALAND HAS NEW AIR SAFETY LAW, at http://www.nzalpa.org.
nz/cgi-bin/nzalpa/display?filename=technical/newlaw.html
&bground (last visited Apr. 17, 2002).
83" See 49 U.S.C. §1114(c)(1) (2000) (stating that the
"Board may not disclose publicly any part of a cockpit voice
or video recorder recording or transcript of oral communica-
tions by and between flight crew members and ground sta-
tions related to an accident or incident investigated by the
Board").
84 See id.
85 See INTERNATIONAL FEI)ERATION OF AIR LINE PILoTs,
POLICY MANUAL, §5.7.3.
86 See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 718 (1987).
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and, to a professional pilot, the cockpit is their of-
fice. Pilots have acquiesced to having that privacy
invaded by a CVR, but only for the purpose of ac-
cident investigation.
When the subject of CVRs comes up in discus-
sions among pilots, a comparison inevitably arises
with the medical community, which, for example,
has no mandatory recorders in the operating
room. Within the period 1982-2000, the year 1996
posted the highest number of deaths caused by
aircraft accidents in scheduled U.S. air carrier ser-
vice.87 There were three fatal accidents, causing
the deaths of 342 persons.88 None of the acci-
dents were attributed to pilot error.8 9 In contrast,
a study published in 2000 by the National Acad-
emy of Sciences ("NAS") estimated that between
44,000 and 98,000 people die annually in the
United States from medical errors that occur in
hospitals. 90 The study also acknowledged that the
aviation industry must be doing something right
because by the early 1990s, "the U.S. airline fatal-
ity rate was less than one-third the rate exper-
ienced in mid century. In 1998, there were no
deaths in the United States in commercial avia-
tion."9' Faced with these statistics, pilots wonder
why they have had to give up their privacy while
members of the medical community have not.
The NAS study does not discuss the possibility
of recording devices for the medical community,
but others have thought of it. For instance, in
London, a prototype Clinical Data Recorder
("CDR") is being used in an experimental operat-
ing theater at Imperial College.
92
In the same way that flight recorders monitor vital data
that can help accident investigators identify the cause
of aircraft crashes, the operating theatre "black box"
would record who was present and what they were do-
ing, monitor patients' vital signs, equipment being
used, record conversations, and track personnel and
even individual hand movements.9 3
87 See NTSB, TABLE 6: ACCIDENTS, FATALITIES, AND RATES,
1982 THROUGH 2001, FOR U.S. AIR CARRIERS OPERATING
UNDER 14 C.F.R. 121, SCHEDULED SERVICE (AIRLINES), at
http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/Table6.htm (last visited Apr.
17, 2002).
88 See NTSB, AVIATION: ACCIDENT DATABASE & SYNOPSES,
at http://www.ntsb.gov/NTSB/query.asp (last visited Apr.
17, 2002) (providing a searchable database containing infor-
mation about civil aviation accidents and selected incidents
from 1962 to the present).
89 See id.
90 See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILD-
ING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000).
91 Id. at 5 (citation omitted) (citing DONALD M. BERWICK
& LUCIAN L. LEAPE, REDUCING ERRORS IN MEDICINE 136-37
But, notwithstanding the benefits of CVRs, the
medical community is aware of the problems that
have followed CVRs into the cockpit; the results
would be the same if CDRs were used to monitor
physicians' activities. An article for the Health
Law and Policy Institute at the University of Hous-
ton Law Center sums up the problems that would
accompany introduction of CDRs to medical facil-
ities.
One potential problem with the widespread use of
CDRs is that the information collected could be used
for purposes other than improving medical quality and
assuring patient safety. The information collected
could be used to promote medical malpractice suits. Pa-
tients who are not satisfied with a surgical outcome
could potentially build a lawsuit around the informa-
tion contained in CDRs.
9 4
As a result, health care workers would be unlikely
to embrace CDRs monitoring them, despite bene-
fits to patients. The medical community would
fear misuse of the tapes and unauthorized inva-
sions of their privacy.
In a recent article touting the dramatic poten-
tial benefits of re-creations and animations in the
courtroom, Richard Schaden dramatizes the im-
pact of tools like CVRs and CDRs.
On final approach, a 737 rolls out of control and dives
into the ground, killing all aboard. A plane with no hy-
draulic control attempts a high-speed emergency land-
ing. As the plane touches down, it begins to cartwheel
and the plane rips apart into fiery shards of wreckage.
These words inspire powerful and tragic images, but
none so powerful as a re-creation of the last five min-
utes of the flight, accompanied by the actual audio from the
cockpit voice recorder. The video depicts the breakup of a
plane, followed by actual footage of the crash shot by
an amateur photographer at the scene.
"9 5
There is no doubt that this type of description
would have a very dramatic impact in the court-
room and that many attorneys would relish the
chance to have actual CVR audio and even video
available for their own use.16 Airline pilots, how-
(1999)).
92 See Black Box for Operating Rooms, REUTERS HEALTH,
Aug. 25, 2001 available at http://www.drkoop.com/dyncon/
article.asp?at=N&id=13137 (last visited Apr. 17, 2002).
93 Id.
94 joseph J. Wang, Black Boxes in the O.?, at http://
www.law.uh.edu/healthlawperspectives/MedicalProfession-
als/01 1004Blackbox.html (Oct. 4, 2001).
95 Richard F. Schaden, Making Them fly: Re-Creations and
Animations in Aviation Litigation, in 2 Assoc. of Trial Lawyers
of America (ATLA)-CLE 1733 (2001) (this article was in-
cluded in the Annual Convention Reference Materials for
ATLA's Aviation Law Section) (emphasis added).
96 The accidents alluded to above were real accidents
that occurred at a time when actual CVR audiotapes were not
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ever, are disturbed by such possibilities. It is po-
tentially their dying words that would be broad-
cast in the courtroom for their families and,
shockingly, their local television affiliates to hear.
That was not the original intent of pilots' acquies-
cence to the introduction of CVRs into their cock-
pits.
9 7
In order to preserve the pilots' expectations of
privacy, and to restrict use of CVR tape recordings
to their originally intended use, Congress
amended the Independent Safety Board Act
("ISBA") in 1990, formulating a bright line rule to
clearly define the permissible uses of CVRs and
their products.118
3. The Bright Line Rule
Congress' intent in adopting the new amend-
ment was to "restrict the ability of litigants to mis-
use the recording or transcription in a lawsuit by
setting standards for discovery. ' 19 Thus, the law
severely restricts access to CVR tapes and tran-
scripts outside the realm of accident investiga-
tion.'1  Litigants are granted access to tapes only
if a fairjudicial proceeding cannot be had without
them and then only with a limiting protective or-
der."1  Being balanced is the promise that the in-
formation gathered in the cockpit would be used
as strictly controlled as they are now. See id.
97 See O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 718.
98 See Independent Safety Board Act Amendments of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-641, 104 Stat. 4654 (1990) (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. App. 1905 (1990)) [hereinafter ISBA
Amendments of 1990]. Title 49 has been partially revised,
placing these restrictions in a new section. The current cita-
tion is 49 U.S.C. §1154 (2000).
99 See Id.
This amendment limits release of CVR information, speci-
fies when it can be released, and permits discovery of the
transcription and recording only in certain limited circum-
stances. Section 306 of the Independent Safety Board Act
provides that CVR recordings and transcripts are not to be
released, except that portions of the transcriptions of oral
communications by and between the flight crew members
and ground stations are to be made available to the public at
the time of the public hearing or no later than 60 days follow-
ing an accident or incident tinder investigation. The amend-
ment also changes section 306 to restrict the ability of liti-
gants to misuse the recording or transcription in a lawsuit by
setting standards for discovery and requiring that, if discovery
of non-public portions of a recording or transcript is ob-
tained, a protective order limiting the use of the information
to that proceeding must be issued. It also prohibits dissemination
of the recording or portion to anyone who does not need the informa-
tion for the proceeding. This provision is intended to eliminate the
use of such information except to ensure that litigants are able to
receive a fair trial.
strictly for accident investigation, and the realiza-
tion that, if a fair judicial proceeding cannot be had
without them, access to the information should be
limited. i112 Not everyone understands this balanc-
ing test. For example, one commentator believes
that requiring the NTSB to release transcripts cre-
ates "an enormous loophole" by making them dis-
coverable. "' This perspective fails to recognize
the very strict language that governs discovery. 104
Moreover, information of real use is already avail-
able in the NTSB's public docket; hearing the re-
cording in chambers is not likely to enrich discov-
ery.
When he signed the 1990 ISBA changes into
law, President George H.W. Bush commented
that "[i]t is important to protect these materials
from sensationalism and unwarranted disclosure,
but it is also important that courts provide prompt
and complete disclosure to litigants with an inter-
est in judicial proceedings involving aircraft acci-
dents."' 5 Given the strict constraints put on dis-
covery of CVR tapes and the non-public portions
of their transcripts, it is facially apparent that
"prompt and complete disclosure" is not part of
Congress' intent.
The ISBA amendments' additional restrictions
foreclose access to information through the
FOIA. Despite the FOIA's pro-disclosure bias, 1°6
In two incidents outlined in testimony before the Com-
mittee ... the transcription in one case and the record-
ing in another case were released to the public in an
inappropriate manner. All parties to an accident investi-
gation recognize both the rights to privacy of the individual
crewmembers and the need to conduct a fair investigation.
This section seeks to maintain a balance between those
interests. The section is not intended, however, to re-
strict the parties to the investigation in any way from ac-
cess to the CVR information, prior to public disclosure,
for purposes of the investigation.
Id. at 104 Stat. 6381 (emphasis added).
i00 This is more in line with the original intent of the law
governing CVRs. See Installation of Cockpit Voice Recorders
in Large Airplanes Used by an Air Carrier or Commercial
Operator, 29 Fed. Reg. at 8401.
101 See ISBA Amendments of 1990, 104 Stat. 4655.
I 02 Id.
03 Donald C. Massey, Proposed On-Board Recorders for Mo-
tor Carriers: Fostering Safer Highways or Unfairly Tilting the Litiga-
tion Playing Field?, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 453, 461 (2000).
104 See H.R. CONF. REP. 97-864, at 3043. The "enormous
loophole" is not a loophole at all, but is in concert with the
original intent to treat actual recordings differently than
transcripts and other data.
1 5 See President's Signing Statement, ISBA Amendments
of 1990, 104 Stat. 6381-1.
1(6 See Robbins, 437 U.S. at 220.
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the 1990 ISBA changes fit precisely within one of
the FOIA exemptions."' 7 The mandate to disclose
information under the FOJA does not apply to
matters that are: "specifically exempted from dis-
closure by statute . . . provided that such statute
(A) requires that the matters be withheld from
the public in such a manner as to leave no discre-
tion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular cri-
teria for withholding or refers to particular types
of matter to be withheld."''° Thus, CVR record-
ings cannot be reached via a FOIA request.
B. Their Dying Utterances
Congress has twice revisited the original legisla-
tion in order to restrict the use of CVR tapes and
transcripts to the originally stated purpose of air-
craft accident investigation. The FAA does not use
CVRs to extract civil penalties;" 9 discovery is
strictly limited to circumstances where a fair judi-
cial proceeding cannot be had without them; and,
the FOIA further limits the availability of CVR in-
formation. Nevertheless, there is still an issue of
disclosure that lies outside the area of accident in-
vestigation. Simply stated, pilots and others are
107 See Rose, 425 U.S. at 361 (emphasizing that the FOIA
exemptions must be narrowly construed).
108 5 U.S.C. §552(b) (3) (2000).
109 14 C.F.R. §91. 6 09(g) (2000) (applying to flight oper-
ations in general); 14 C.F.R. §121.359(h) (2000) (applying to
air carrier operations).
110 Families normally are not privy to CVR tapes, but in
the aftermath of the crash of United Flight 93 in Penn-
sylvania on September 11, 2001, some family members asked
to hear the CVR tapes. The FBI-not the NTSB-agreed to
it. SeeJohn Curran, FBI to Let Relatives of light 93 Victims Hear
Cockpit Recordings, CHArTTANOOGA TIMES/CHATANOOGA FREE
PRESS, Mar. 26, 2002, at A5:
"I don't know what I'm going to hear, but I need to hear
it," said Patrick Welsh, whose 49-year-old-wife, Deborah,
was the lead flight attendant on board. "It's going to be a
horrific thing to listen to. In some ways it may appear
almost masochistic, after what all of us have been
through. But you're trying to find a truth, trying to get
some more information about the events."
The National Transportation Safety Board, which inves-
tigates aviation accidents, has never allowed relatives to
listen to cockpit tapes, spokesman Ted Lopatkiewicz
said. Under federal law, the safety board cannot release
the tapes and can only give out transcripts during a pub-
lic hearing or when a majority of factual reports on the
crash are completed, Lopatkiewicz said.
Welsh lauded the government's decision, saying it bal-
anced family members' right to know with privacy con-
siderations.
willing to tolerate the invasion of their privacy in
the interests of public safety. But they are not will-
ing to tolerate an invasion so that their loved ones
can hear their dying screams on the evening
news,110 or so that their grieving survivors can be
sued for the pilots' alleged negligence. Over time,
however, portions of the transcripts germane to
an accident are released to the public, including
the media' and interested attorneys. Little, if
anything, is gained by this wider distribution.
In the aftermath of a Delta 727 crash in Dallas
on August 31,.1988, a Texas state court ordered
the release of the CVR tape through discovery.' 12
It ended up being played on the evening news'"
and, more recently, has been available on the In-
ternet. The airing of the tape on the evening news
preceded the ISBA amendments in 1990, which
placed tighter restrictions on the release of CVR
tapes and, in fact, is what gave rise to those
amendments.' 4 To the horror of survivors, how-
ever, some tapes still find their way to the public.
Foreign governments' accident investigations
often are not as restricted as those of U.S. agen-
cies,I 15 and this can result in release of a CVR tape
to unintended recipients. Following the crash of
Under threat of lawsuits from the surviving relatives, the
FBI played the CVR tapes for family members on April 18,
2002. See David Snyder, Families Hear Flight 93's Final Moments,
WASH. POST, April 19, 2002 at A3. It remains to be seen if
family members listening to cockpit events in the final mo-
ments of Flight 93 heard anything that will contribute to the
investigation or whether it merely whet the appetites of rela-
tives of future victims and thereby opened a Pandora's box.
Id.
III The media's use of CVR transcripts is not limited to
news reporting and analysis. The 1998 book, The Black Box:
All-New Cockpit Voice Recorder Accounts of In-flight Accidents, ed-
ited by Malcolm MacPherson and published by Qtill, is an
updated compilation of CVR transcripts which the publisher
touts as providing "a heartbreaking, second-by-second ac-
cotnt of intense fear tempered by unyielding professional-
ism." See HARPERCOLLINS.COM, THE BLACK Box: ALL-NEW
COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER ACCOUNTS OF IN-FLIGHT ACCIDENTS,
at http://www.harpercollins.com/catalog/book_xml.asp?
isbn=0688158927 (last visited Oct. 30, 2002). Sarah Vowell, a
reviewer of the book says, "I confess, as a fan of detective
novels and detective movies and detective TV shows, I find
the question of how someone dies inherently fascinating. As
an audiophile, the very idea of recordings that offer the sound
of death is wildly titillating." Sarah Vowell, American Squirm:
Fear of Flying, SALON.COM, at http://archive.salon.com/ent/
music/vowe/1998/08/24vowe.litnil (last visited Apr. 17,
2002) (emphasis in original).
112 SeeJohnson, supra note 63, at 5.
''3 Id.
114 Id.
115 See Press Release, Air Line Pilots Associ:,ti(iI, Pilots
Angered Over Use of Cockpit Voice Recorder on "Dateline:
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an American 757 during an approach into Cali,
Colombia on the night of December 20, 1995, an
agency of the Colombian government conducted
the post-crash investigation with technical assis-
tance from the NTSB.1 6 Somehow, a copy of the
CVR audio tape ended up in the possession of the
NBC television network, which, despite requests
not to do so, aired portions of the tape as part of a
story on their program, Dateline:, on January 19,
2000.117 Since the NTSB is prohibited from releas-
ing CVR tapes1  and courts are severely restricted
from allowing their use in discovery,' 19 the tape
apparently had been obtained from an unofficial
source, leaving no method to prevent its broad-
cast. The airing of the tape was criticized by then
NTSB Chairman Jim Hall.' 2 0 Hall's criticism was
echoed by the Allied Pilots Association
("APA"), 1 2 1 which represents the American pilots,
and by ALPA. 122 The Cali accident is discussed in
more detail below.
There is also the issue of CVR ownership. At the
completion of an investigation, the CVR tape is re-
turned to the aircraft's operator.125 While statutes
restrict what NTSB and the courts may do with
the CVR tape, 124 there are no such restrictions on
the tape's owner. Universal access afforded by the
Internet then becomes an issue. If a person enters
the appropriate search criteria into any compe-
tent Internet search engine, he will find a number
of Web sites that have actual CVR recordings.
NBC", at http://cf.alpa.org/internet/news/2000news/
nr00005.htm Uan. 19, 2000) (last visited Oct. 30, 2002)
[hereinafter Pilots Angered Over Use of Cockpit Voice Re-
corder on "Dateline: NBC"].
1 16 See Press Release, NTSB, Columbian Press Release-
Factual Data Aircraft Accident Investigation (Dec. 28, 1995),
at http://www.rvs.ini-bielefeld.de/publications/lncidents/
DOCS/ComAndRep/Cali/cali-prelimreport.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 30, 2002).
117 Id.
118 See 49 U.S.C. §114(c) (1994).
1'9 See 49 U.S.C. §1154 (1994).
121 See Press Release, NTSB, Statement by NTSB Chair-
man Jim Hall on Broadcasting of Cockpit Voice Recorder
Tape (Jan. 19, 2000), at http://www.NTSB.gov/Pressrel/
2000/000119.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2002). Hall stated,
"The use of such a recording - however it was obtained - for
such a purpose is inappropriate. It does nothing to advance
the cause of aviation safety, and only serves to sensationalize
a tragedy." Id.
121 See ALLIED PILOTS ASSOCIATION, APA INFORMATION
HOTLINE, at http://www.alliedpilots.org/Public/Hotline/
prevhl.asp?id=20000120 (Jan. 20, 2000).
122 See Pilots Angered Over Use of Cockpit Voice Re-
corder on "Dateline: NBC," supra note 115.
Some are innocuous, but some are grisly and not
for the faint of heart.
Bolstering the privacy interest argument are
two cases from the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit ("D.C. Cir-
cuit"). Section (b) (6) of the FOIA permits with-
holding of "personnel/medical and other files
disclosure of which would violate personal pri-
vacy." 12 5 Drawing from this wording, the D.C. Cir-
cuit held that the release of an autopsy report by
the Air Force would "shock the sensibilities of sur-
viving kin" 12 6 and "constitute a 'clearly unwar-
ranted invasion of personal privacy.' "127
Six months after the destruction of the space
shuttle Challenger in 1986, which killed all seven
astronauts aboard, a reporter from the New York
Times submitted a FOIA request to NASA for tran-
scripts and copies of all voice and data communi-
cations recorded on the ill-fated shuttle. In New
York Times v. National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration,'2 the reporter argued that the public
had a "strong interest"'129 in disclosure because it
was "the best available record of governmental ac-
tivity" aboardthe Challenger in the moments just
prior to the accident.""' The reporter also argued
that the public "has a strong and legitimate inter-
est in gaining a full understanding of the disaster,
and of the conduct of the agency and its employ-
ees in the events and activities during and after
that incident."''
The trial court ordered the release of the
What 'Dateline: NBC did was outrageous and absolutely
inexcusable. This is every airline pilot's worst nightmare,
to have what often turns out to be the last few minutes of
his life made public, not for any advancement of aviation
safety, but as an exploitative and sensationalistic public
spectacle on the airwaves. Id.
12-3 See NTSB INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, VOL. III - RE-
GIONAL INVESTIGATIONS, at 3-148, available at http://ame-
lia.db.erau.edu/onlinebkutp/1181.3.pdf (last visited Oct. 23,
2002) [hereinafter INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL].
12'l See 49 U.S.C. §1154 (1994).
I25 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(6) (2000). (emphasis added). The
FOIA at section 552(b) (3) also exempts from disclosure any-
thing specifically exempted by statute "provided that such
statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the
public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the is-
sue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or
refers to particular types of matters to be withheld." Id.
12 Badhwar v. United States Dep't of Air Force, 829 F.2d
182, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
127 Id. (emphasis added).
128 782 F. Supp 628 (D.D.C. 1991).





tape. 132 After appeals and rehearings, the D.C.
Circuit agreed that the public had a legitimate in-
terest in learning about NASA's conduct, but held
that the tape's release would not further that in-
terest "in any way." 13 3 In so deciding, the court re-
lied on a then recent Supreme Court opinion in
which the Court upheld the FBI's refusal to dis-
close the "rap sheet" of a private citizen under the
FOIA.'1 4 In United States Department of Justice v. Re-
porters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 13 5 the Su-
preme Court applied the following standard in
holding that the public interest was insufficient to
require disclosure:
The basic policy of "full agency disclosure ... focuses
on the citizens' right to be informed about 'what their govern-
ment is up to." Official information that sheds light on
an agency's performance of its statutory duties falls
squarely within that statutory purpose. That purpose,
however, is not fostered by disclosure of information
about private citizens that is accumulated in various
governmental files but that reveals little or nothing
about an agency's own conduct .... Indeed, response
to this request would not shed any light on the conduct
of any Government agency or official. 13
The Court went on to reiterate that Congress's
"core purpose" in creating the FOIA was to con-
tribute "significantly to public understanding of
the operations or activities of the government." 
13 7
In National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
the plaintiff argued that the "voice inflections and
background noises which are contained only in
the tape would 'contribute significantly' to the
public's understanding of the operations of
NASA." 13s The court found, however, that "any
voice inflections and background noises [on the
tape] ... might reveal something as to whether the
astronauts knew about the disaster and their im-
pending deaths." This would not contribute "any-
thing to the public's knowledge of how NASA op-
erates.' 39 The plaintiff needed to produce more
evidence to make the release of the tape worth-
while under the FOIA standard.
The court did find it significant that NASA had
provided the public with a transcript of the tape.
This transcript reveals to the public every word that was
132 New York Times v. Nat'l Aeronautics and Space Ad-
min., 679 F.Supp 33 (D.D.C. 1987), vacated by 782 F.Supp 628
(D.D.C. 1991).
133 Nat'l Aeronautics and Space Admin., 782 F. Supp at 632.
134 United States Dep't. of Justice v. Reporters Comm.
for the Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989).
135 Id.
136 Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
137 Id. at 775 (emphasis in original).
138 Nat'l Aeronautics and Space Admin., 782 F.Supp. at 633.
spoken in the cabin. Plaintiff does not dispute its accu-
racy, but hypothesizes that information can still be
gained from voice inflections and background noises.
The extremely speculative and subjective nature of this
additional information, if available, precludes any find-
ing the information would "significantly contribute" to
the public understanding of the Challenger disaster.14 o
The Court thus found that the public interest in
disclosing the actual recordings was minimal or
nonexistent. 141
Having determined that releasing the CVR tape
would not contribute significantly to the public's
understanding of NASA or the Challenger acci-
dent, the court next undertook a balancing test to
determine whether the disclosure of the tape
"would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy."'1 2 In doing so, the court fol-
lowed the precedent of O'Connor v. Ortega, which
concluded that a person has "a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in his office." 143 On one hand,
the National Aeronautics and Space Adminstration
court held that the "'clearly unwarranted' lan-
guage of the FOIA exemption 6 weights the scales
in favor of disclosure." 144 On the other hand,
however, it determined that "where the privacy in-
terest is substantial, the public interest uncertain,
and where the agency has already released materi-
als responsive to the request, the balance tips to-
wards non-disclosure." 145 The court concluded:
The Challenger families have a substantial privacy interest
in non-disclosure of the tape. Plaintiff has asserted at best a
speculative public interest in disclosure. NASA has
made a written transcript of the tape available to the
public. Thus, the Court determines that the privacy in-
terest in non-disclosure clearly outweighs the public in-
terest.146
Thus, the court held that no one outside the acci-
dent investigation scheme-at least no one from
the media-had a legitimate interest in hearing
the astronauts' dying utterances. This holding
thus addresses the piloting community's privacy
objections concerning the release of CVR tapes.
Their other objection involves the problem that
may arise from releasing CVR tapes to the legal
establishment. 1
47
139 Id. (emphasis in original).
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 See5 U.S.C. §552(b)(6) (2000).
143 O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 718.
144 Nat'lAeronautics and Space Admin., 782 F.Supp. at 633.
14" Id.
146 Id. (emphasis added).
147 See Installation of Cockpit Voice Recorders supra note




Since Congress did not intend "prompt and
complete disclosure" of CVR tapes and unre-
leased portions of transcripts, 4 how, then, do at-
torneys gain access to materials for litigation pur-
poses? It turns out that the readily available prod-
ucts of both CVRs and FDRs are frequently used
by both sides in litigation-often, with decisive re-
sults. Access to actual recordings is simply unnec-
essary.
In the wake of American Flight 965's crash in
the mountains near Cali, Colombia in 1995 that
killed all but four people aboard, multiple liability
claims arose against American and others. One
case against American, In re Air Crash Near Cali,
Columbia on December 20, 1995, that involved the
pilots' estates and American's parent company,
made effective use of a transcription of the CVR
tape in a successful motion for summary judg-
ment. 1
49
In Cali, the aircraft approached from the north,
and the pilots wanted to land to the south.'15 In
other words, the pilots wanted to land the plane
straight ahead rather than by having to overfly the
airport and turn back around, which would have
added several minutes to an already delayed
flight.' 5' The clearance for this approach came
late in the arrival process, so the pilots had to ex-
pedite their descent.'.5 The CVR transcript shows
that the pilots entered an incorrect navigation fix
into the computer, resulting in the aircraft turn-
ing east into mountainous terrain while in de-
14" See 49 U.S.C. §1114(c) (2000).
149 985 F.Supp. 1106 (1997).
151 Id. at III.
151 Id.
152 [i. at 1118.
153 Id. at 1119.
154 i. at 1138.
155 See Honeywell International, Inc.'s Enhanced
Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS), at http://
www.egpws.com/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2002). The Web site
provides one manufacttrer's informative descriptions of the
newest technologies available to warn pilots about impending
controlled flight into terrain ("CFIT") and provides an audio
example of the aural warning. GPWS and its younger sibling
EGPWS provide cockpit warnings concerning approaching
terrain. Older systems were triggered by either the aircraft's
height above terrain as measured by a radio altimeter or an
excessive rate of descent. The newest systems generate warn-
ings by comparing present aircraft position to an onboard
database of terrain elevations. Since the EGPWS systems
"look" at the area in front of an aircraft and not just straight
down, they can warn pilots of rising terrain in front of their
aircraft, thereby giving precious additional time to make cor-
scent. 5 " The pilots were evidently unaware of
how far off track they were and probably could
see nothing outside the airplane in the dark of
night. 54 The aircraft's Ground Proximity Warn-
ing System ("GPWS") 155 warned them of the ap-
proaching terrain too late. 15" The aircraft crashed
13 seconds later.
57
The Cali court relied heavily on the CVR tran-
script1 58 in entering summary judgment for the
plaintiffs.
[O]ne of [the pilots'] grievous errors-their continued
descent from a position that was radically off course at
night in an environment where the risk from high ter-
rain was palpable and profound-was so plainly reck-
less, so dangerous, so extreme a violation of the stan-
dard of care and so directly responsible for the collision
with the mountain-that even allowing the Defendant
every benefit of the doubt, the law requires that sum-
mary judgment be entered for the Plaintiffs on this ba-
sis alone. 159
Without the detailed information provided by the
transcripts, a clear understanding of why this air-
plane crashed likely would never have been
found. Moreover, proving liability would have
been difficult, making summary judgment un-
likely.'"" Here, access to the actual tapes was un-
necessary because the transcripts were sufficient
to persuade the court to rule in the plaintiffs
favor.
In an intriguing twist, the Cali court had access
to two transcripts and the audio tape. The tran-
script used by the plaintiffs in their motion was
obtained from the NTSB,16 1 and the other was
produced by an expert retained by American.
62
The record does not show how the court came
rections. Id.
156 See Ca/i, 985 F. Supp. at 1122.
157 See i.
158 Id. at 1115. "A great deal of our understanding of
what unfolded during the final minutes of Flight 965 is based
on the cockpit voice recorder ... [transcript]." Id.
159 Id.
n60 Summary judgment is a "procedural device available
for prompt and expeditious disposition of controversy with-
out trial when there is no dispute as to either material fact or
inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts, or if only ques-
tion of law is involved." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1435
(1990). See also, FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
161 See Cali, 985 F.Supp at 1115. The NTSB does not in-
vestigate accidents nor produce CVR transcripts for the pur-
pose of litigation, but the portions that are pertinent to an
accident investigation are made public in accordance with 49
U.S.C. §1114(c), which states "the Board shall make public
any part of a transcript or any written depiction of visual in-





into possession of the tape.' 63 Considering that
Colombian authorities, not the NTSB, conducted
this investigation, and that American Airlines
("American") was the owner of the CVR, 16 4 it is
probable that the tape came from one of these
two sources. 1
65
Two issues arise from this twist of circumstance.
First, the audio recording's availability did not al-
ter the case's outcome. In fact, the opinion only
mentions the recording, which was played in
chambers with both counsel present, 166 when it
discusses the differences between the two tran-
scripts. 67 It appears that comparing the two tran-
scripts and the tape merely demonstrated that the
American-produced transcript benefited the air-
line, while the NTSB's transcript more accurately
reflected the recording. 168 This outcome supports
continued reliance on transcripts produced by
neutral experts and also argues against litigants'
discovery of recordings.
The evidence provided by the CVR transcripts,
however, demonstrated American's liability
clearly enough to support the motion for sum-
mary judgment. 16 9 As American and the court
both learned, possession of the actual recording
did not provide any additional evidence, alter the
dramatic story told in the NTSB transcript, or
change the case's outcome.
The second issue that arises in the context of
litigation involves access to the tapes. At the com-
pletion of an investigation, the tape is returned to
the aircraft operator. 1 7 0 If one side in a case has a
copy of the tape, it would seem only fair that op-
ponents have access as well. In Cali, both sides evi-
dently had access to the CVR tape because it was
"reviewed in chambers and in the presence of
counsel.' 1 7 1 Barring a similar set of circumstances,
where the recording apparently is released by an
entity other than the NTSB, there can be a percep-
163 See generally, Cali, 985 F. Supp. at 1153-54.
164 See INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 123, at 3-148.
165 Cali, 985 F. Supp. at 1115. The court noted in its Or-
der that the differences between the transcripts were "gener-
ally of little moment" as determined by the judge after having
listened to the tape. Id.
166 Id. at 1140 n.21.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 1134 n.18, 1139 n.21.
.19 Id. at 1153.
170 See IN&ESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 123, at 3-148.
171 Cali, 965 F.Supp at 1139 n.21.
172 See INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 123, at 3-148.
173 See NTSB Providing Technical Assistance to FBI In-
vestigation, supra note 7.
tion that if the federal government is a litigant, the
government might have an advantage in the case.
The reality, however, is that while the tape is in
the government's possession, it is with the NTSB
for an accident investigation1 72 or the FBI for a
criminal investigation,1 73 but is not available to
other agencies not directly involved in the investi-
gation.1
74
The conundrum produced by the government's
possession of a tape is addressed tangentially in
the case, McGilvra v. National Transportation Safety
Board, involving the crash of a United Airlines 737
on March 3, 1991 while it was on approach to the
airport in Colorado Springs, Colorado. 1 75 All of
those aboard were killed, including a relative of
Jack McGilvra. 176 McGilvra sought a copy of the
CVR tape through the FOIA. 177 The NTSB re-
fused to release the tape, citing section 1905(c) of
the Independent Safety Board Act.178 On appeal,
the NTSB's Managing Director again denied re-
lease of the tape.1 79 This last denial led McGilvra
to file suit in the Federal District Court in the Dis-
trict of Colorado seeking a copy of the tape for
accident reconstruction purposes.'8 ° McGilvra
submitted three arguments to support his claim:
(1) the statutory prohibition regarding NTSB re-
lease found in section 1905 of the ISBA' 81 was not
a FOIA exemption; (2) the tape should be re-
leased pursuant to section 1903(d) (3) of the ISBA
because it was necessary for a fair trial; and (3)
that section 1905 of the ISBA was unconstitu-
tional. 1
82
The court did not accept any of McGilvra's ar-
guments. 1 3 The court determined that the stat-
ute qualified as a FOIA exemption. 84 Therefore,
it did not have the authority to grant discovery
under section 1905(d) (3) of the ISBA.
This court is not oblivious to the seeming unfairness of
the practical impact of the above cited statutes: to allow
174 See INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 123, at 3-148.
175 McGilvra v. Nat'l Transportation Safety Bd., 840
F.Supp.100 (Colo. 1993).
176 See id. The published opinion does not describe
plaintiff's relationship to the decedent, Paula McGilvra. Id.
177 McGilvra, 840 F.Supp. at 101.
178 See ISBA Amendments of 1990, supra, note 98.
179 McGilvra, 840 F.Supp. at 101.
180 Id.
181 See ISBA Amendments of 1990, supra, note 98. (Title
49 has been partially revised, placing these restrictions in a
new section. The current citation is 49 U.S.C. §1154 (2000)).
182 McGilvra, 840 F. Supp. at 101.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 102.
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representatives of defendants in air crash cases access
to CVR tapes in their capacities as parties designated to
participate in the investigation, while denying plaintiffs
and their representatives and expert investigators equal
access to the facts. This argument, however, must be ad-
dressed to Congress, not to a court where, as here, the
intent of Congress is clear.' H5
Thus, the court recognized the government's le-
gitimate requirement to withhold a CVR tape
from a plaintiff seeking it for litigation purposes.
Another case is also illustrative. During the
night of September 1, 1983, Soviet fighters shot
down Korean Airlines ("KAL") Flight 007, when it
strayed from its planned route into Soviet airspace
over the Sea of Japan.I1 ' The FDR and CVR were
recovered by Soviet authorities and held for al-
most a decade. 8 7 Meanwhile, In re Korean Air
Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, a consolidation
of some 190 cases, a jury returned a verdict that
the 747's loss and the deaths of everyone on
board were proximately caused by the willful mis-
conduct of KAL Flight 007's pilots.' 88 The deci-
sion was upheld, but punitive damages were va-
cated pursuant to the Warsaw Convention.
89
In October 1992, after the Soviet Union's col-
lapse, and more than nine years after KAL Flight
007 was shot down, the Russian Federation re-
leased documentation surrounding the inci-
dent. 9 This was followed by the release of the
CVR and FDR from KAL 007, along with record-
ings and transcripts of the conversations of the So-
viet fighter pilots responsible for shooting down
the airliner.' 91 In June of 1993, based on this
newly acquired information, ICAO issued a report
that shed some light on the events of September
1, 1983.192 Armed with this report, KAL filed a
motion to vacate and set aside the earlier judg-
ment."g-zl The motion was denied under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2)194 because the
recorders and their information were considered
185 Id. at 102 (emphasis added).
186 See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1,
1983, 932 F.2d 1475, 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
187 See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1,
1983, 156 F.R.D. 18, 20 (1994).
188 Korean, 932 F.2d at 1477.
189 Korean, 156 F.R.D. at 14.





195 Id. at 22.
196 iJ
197 Id. at 25.
"newly discovered evidence" which was not sub-
mitted within the Rule's one-year time limit.
95
The court also held that the ICAO report and the
information on the recorders supported the jury's
guilty verdict, 196 and accordingly, it denied KAL's
motion for equitable relief'1
97
While KAL could not avail itself of the informa-
tion available from the recorders, others could.
Eric Forman, the husband of a passenger killed
on KAL Flight 007, made use of the data from the
CVR and FDR.' 981 In Forman v. Korean Air Lines,
Forman was awarded damages for his wife's pre-
death pain and suffering.199 The court reversed
other jury awards. 110 Both KAL and Forman ap-
pealedY.1 The D.C. Circuit upheld the award for
the wife's pre-death pain and suffering. 202 This
decision was based largely on the information
from the recorders,203 but no one had to hear the
actual recordings to make the award determina-
tion. 2
4
The issue of passenger pre-death pain and suf-
fering turned on a determination of whether or
not those aboard the doomed airplane could have
survived the initial explosion caused by the mis-
sile.2115 Each side produced expert witnesses testi-
fying to support, their contentions that the occu-
pants of the airplane did or did not survive the
initial explosion and loss of pressurization long
enough to have experienced any physical pain
and suffering.206 While earlier cases were forced
to rely on expert speculation, the Forman court
had the benefit of the information from the re-
corders.
The ICAO report showed that the FDR contin-
ued to run for at least 104 seconds after the mis-
sile's impact.2 0 7 No mention is made as to
whether the recorders stopped because the FDR
lost power or because the aircraft broke apart.
KAL argued that the missile must have blown a
198 See generally Forman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 84 F.3d
446 (D.C.Cir. 1996).
199 Id. at 448.
2010 Id.
2011 Id. at 447.
202 Id.
2(13 Id. at 449.
204 Id. (explaining that expert testimony provided the
requisite evidence for the court to make its determination.
No mention is made of publicly playing the CVR audio
tapes.).
205 Id. at 448.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 449.
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large hole in the fuselage, 20 8 thus equalizing the
pressure inside the cabin with the pressure
outside at 35,000 feet, rendering the passengers
unconscious and "thus anesthetized to pain."
20 9
The CVR, however, "captured the flight crew's
post impact actions and utterances. '" 21 0 Based on
this information, Forman's experts testified that
the passengers had enough time to put their oxy-
gen masks on and remain conscious for the 9 to
12 minute descent to the ocean.2 1I This was am-
ple time for the passengers to suffer anguish from
the specter of the, impending crash and physical
pain from rapid decompression. 212 Thus, this cru-
cial sliver of evidence from the CVR that was deliv-
ered by the ICAO's written report was the
lynchpin in this successful pursuit of damages for
pain and suffering. Access to the CVR tape itself
was unnecessary.
Attorneys who seek access to actual CVR record-
ings often argue that because the NTSB's initial
findings are not admissible in court,213 the attor-
neys must assemble their own team of experts, in-
cluding CVR speech pathologists, to supplement
the small amount of available information. 21 4 A
recent example, however, serves to demonstrate
that even the written words of a CVR transcript
can produce rich evidentiary material.
On December 15, 1993, a Westwind business jet
crashed while on approach to John Wayne Airport
in Santa Ana, California.2" 5 The small airplane en-






213 See, 49 U.S.C. §1154(b) (1994) (stating that "[n]o
part of a report of the Board, related to an accident or an
investigation of an accident, may be admitted into evidence
or used in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter
mentioned in the report"). See also, e.g. Curry v. Chevron, 779
F.2d 272, 274 (5th. Cir. 1985); Chiron v. NTSB, 198 F.3d 935,
936 (D.D.C. 1999). Notwithstanding the statute's prohibition
of admission of any part of a report of the Board, courts have
generally concluded, and Congress has not corrected the no-
tion, that it is the Board's opinions and conclusions that are
inadmissible, not factual parts of reports. See, e.g., Mullan v.
Quickie Aircraft Corp., 797 F.2d 845, 848 (10th Cir. 1986)
(stating that an "expert witness properly relied on the factual
portions of the NTSB report"); Texasgulf, Inc. v. Colt Elec-
tronics Co., Inc., 615 F.Supp. 648, 651 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(explaining that the "NTSB factual findings are admissible in
evidence, but its conclusions, and findings indicating its con-
clusions, are not"); and In re Air Crash at Charlotte, N.C. on
July 2, 1994, 982 F.Supp. 1071, 1077 (D.S.C. 1996) (explain-
ing that "[s]ignificantly, in recodifying §§1441(e) and
uncontrollable when it followed too closely to a
Boeing 757.216 The results of the crash became
the subject of Management Activities, Inc. v. United
States.2" I The Westwind CVR transcript, used in a
cross-claim action against the government alleg-
ing negligence by the FAA, indicated pilot er-
ror.2 18 The opinion points out that "[a] reasona-
ble Westwind pilot .. . [in these circumstances]
would be very concerned about potential wake tur-
bulence affecting much smaller aircraft. '" 21 9 The
CVR transcript contained several statements by
the pilots indicating that they were aware of their
aircraft's proximity to the 757 and that they "real-
ize [d] they were flying into danger."220 The tran-
script indicated that at least one pilot was "con-
cerned."22' Unfortunately, this pilot's concern did
not translate into a response necessary to avert
the crash. 22 2 Nonetheless, the CVR transcript pro-
vided sufficient information to show that the pi-
lots were concerned by circumstances they had
gotten themselves into.
D. Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions:
The Current Battleground
Congress amended the CVR statute again in
2000.228 The amendment extended the restric-
tions on public disclosure to "voice and video re-
corder information for all modes of transporta-
tion comparable to the protections already statu-
torily provided for cockpit voice recorders.
'" 224
1903(c) at §1154(b), Congress used the identical language of
the previous statutes presumably knowing that that language
had been long construed to permit the admissibility of the
factual portions of Group Chairmen's Factual Reports.").
214 See Thomas A. Demetria & Michael K. Demetrio,
Fighting the Elements, Beyond the Thunder, Dealing Effectively with
Adverse Weather and Its Contribution to Air Disaster, 34 AuG
TRIAL 52, 54 (1998).
215 Management Activities, Inc. v. United States, 21 F
.Supp. 2d 1157, 1160 (C.D.Cal. 1998).
216 Id. at 1161.
217 See generally id.
218 Id. at 1171.
219 Id. at 1170 (emphasis added).
220 Id. at 1171.
221 Id. at 1172 (quoting from the CVR transcript, with
nuance interpreted by the team of NTSB experts who pro-
duced it) (emphasis added).
222 Id. at 1171-72.
223 National Transportation Safety Board Amendments
Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-424, 114 Stat. 1883 (2000) (here-
inafter NTSB Amendment Act of 2000].
224 Id. at 3 (emphasis added). See also Press Release, Sen-
atorJohn McCain, Senate Approves NTSB Amendments Act
of 2000 (Oct. 3, 2000).
20031
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
The amendment also reiterated the confidential-
ity of recordings, created procedures for the
NTSB to turn over its investigation to the FBI in
the event of an intentional criminal act, and it di-
rected the NTSB and FBI to revise their existing
agreement accordingly.2 25 The amendment is si-
lent on confidentiality of CVR tapes in the con-
text of an FBI criminal investigation. However,
the underlying original intent that recorders and
their products will be used solely for investigative
purposes remains, and no government agency
should be permitted to release more than the
NTSB is permitted to release.
Confidentiality of CVR tapes is coming into play
in the government's case against suspected terror-
ist Zacarias Moussaoui.226 Moussaoui was indicted
on December 11, 2001 on six counts of conspiracy
for alleged acts tied to the events of September
11, 2001.227 In preparation for its plans to play the
CVR tapes during the trial, the Government
moved for a protective order pursuant to the sec-
tion 1154 of the NTSB's enabling statute.2 218 This
section provides:
(4) (A) When a court allows discovery in a judicial pro-
ceeding of a part of a cockpit or surface vehicle re-
corder transcript not made available to the public
under section 1114(c) or 1114(d) of this title ora cock-
pit or surface vehicle recorder recording, the court
shall issue a protective order-
(i) to limit the use of the part of the transcript or the
recording to the judicial proceeding; and
(ii) to prohibit dissemination of the part of the tran-
script or the recording to any person that does not
225 See NTSB Amendment Act of 2000, supra note 223 at
§6.
226 Indictment, United States v. Zacarias Moussaoui,
Criminal No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. filed Dec. 11, 2001), availa-
ble at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/
docs/64329/0.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2002).
227 Id.
228 Government's Motion for Protective Order Regard-
ing Cockpit Voice Recorders Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §1154 ,
United States v. Zacarias Moussaoui, Criminal No. 01455-A
(E.D. Va. 2001), available at http://notablecases.vaed.us
courts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/67044/0.pdf (last visited
Nov. 7, 2002) [hereinafter Government's Motion].
229 49 U.S.C. §1154 (1994).
230 Brief of Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc.
Opposing the Government's Motion for Protective Order Re-
garding Cockpit Voice Recorders, United States v. Zacarias
Moussaoui, Criminal No. 01455-A (E.D. Va. 2001), available
at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/
docs/67147/0.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2002).
231 Id.
232 Brief of Intervenor Air Line Pilots Association, Inter-
national in Opposition to Gannett Satellite Information Net-
work, Inc.'s Request for Access to Cockpit Voice Recorder
need access to the part of the transcript or the record-
ing for the proceeding.
(B) A court may allow a part of a cockpit or surface
vehicle recorder transcript not made available to the
public under section 1114(c) or 1114(d) of this title or
a cockpit or surface vehicle recorder recording to be
admitted into evidence in ajudicial proceeding, only if
the court places the part of the transcript or the record-
ing under seal to prevent the use of the part of the tran-
script or the recording for purposes other than for the
proceeding. 
2 9
Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc.
("Gannett"), publisher of USA Today, opposed the
government's motion. 23 1 1 Gannett argued that the
public has a First Amendment right of public ac-
cess to the trial and that this right includes access
to all documents that are submitted during the
course of the trial.
23 1
In its reply brief, the ALPA argued that the CVR
statute specifically prohibits releasing the tapes.
23 2
ALPA also asserted that both the Supreme Court
and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit have upheld withholding sensitive
evidence from the public in the past, including
audio tapes from the media. 2 -3  ALPA argued that
in order to maintain confidentiality, access to the
tapes and transcripts presented during the hear-
ing should be restricted. 2 ,3 4 ALPA cited decisions
upholding the exclusion of press and public from
a criminal trial235 in order to demonstrate the
lack of a constitutional or common law right of
access to CVR tapes,2 3 6 and to demonstrate the re-
strictions in place to limit the media from gaining
access to CVR audio tapes played in court.
237
Tapes, United States v. Zacarias Moussaoui, Criminal No. 01-
455-A, available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/
1:01-cr-00455/docs/67744/0.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2002).
233 See id. (citing Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.,
435 U.S. 589, 608-10 (1978) and In re Washington Post Co.,
807 F.2d 383, 390 (4th Cir. 1986)).
234 Id. at 14.
235 Id. (citing Bell v.Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 166-68 (4th Cir.
2000) (explaining that the "right of press and public to at-
tend a criminal trial is a qualified right; there, the interest in
safeguarding physical and psychological well-being of minors
prevailed and the public and press were properly ex-
cluded")).
2_35 Id. at 17 (citing United States v. Calloway, No. 94-
20112 (W.D. Tenn., Aug. 31, 1995) (stating that the "court
need not decide [the statutory] issue, however, because even
assuming that [section] 1154 does not prevent release of the
tape, the court finds the media do not have a constitutional or
common law right of access to the tape") (emphasis added).
2317 Id. at 16-17 (citing US Airways, Inc. v. Parker-Han-
nifin Corp., C.A. No. 99-CV-917 (W.D. Pa., June 19, 2002)).
See also Government's Motion, supra note 228, at 2 (explain-
ing that "[d]uring the US Airways litigation, the CVR record-




In the wake of the events of September 11, the
FAA has proposed that video cameras be installed
in airplane cabins. 238 By looking at the feeds pro-
duced by the cameras, pilots then could monitor
what is happening from behind their barricaded
cockpit door.239 This proposal is only one part of
the FAA's new Enhanced Airplane Security Pro-
gram. 240 Long before September 11, however,
the NTSB recommended that cockpit video re-
corders be used to supplement CVRs.24 1 For ex-
ample, in April 2000, the NTSB recommended in-
stalling cockpit video recorders2 4 2 in planes,
largely in response to the crash of an Egypt Air
Boeing 767 into the Atlantic Ocean near Nan-
tucket, Massachusetts on October 23, 1999.243 Al-
though there is no conclusive evidence available
concerning the Egypt Air crash, the CVR record-
ing has led some to believe that the co-pilot may
have crashed the plane deliberately.24 4 First, inves-
tigators concluded that there were no mechanical
problems with the airplane when it crashed.
245
Second, CVR information indicated that the co-
pilot was alone in the cockpit and uttered what
may have been a prayer 24 6 before the autopilot
was disengaged, and the aircraft plummeted into
the ocean. 247 During the high speed descent an-
and the Court, consistent with [section] 1154(a) (4) (B),
placed the CVR audio under seal. The Court granted WTAE-
TV access to a videotape of the animation with the CVR re-
dacted.").
238 FAA, FAA ENHANCED AIRPLANE SECURITY PROGRAM, at
http://www.airweb.faa.gov/airplanesecurity/announce.htm
(last visited Oct. 30, 2002).
239 Id.
240 Id. There are current initiatives by airlines and others
to install video surveillance cameras in aircraft cabins and
outside the aircraft to enable pilots to observe potentially
threatening activity in the cabin and on the ground. In fact, a
panel organized by the ICAO made such recommendations a
year before the terrorist attacks of September, 2001. See Chris
Woodyard, Panel Wants Cameras in Plane Cabins, USA TODAY,
Sept. 28, 2000, at lB. In the aftermath of the September,
2001 attacks, some airlines have already begun to install these
cameras. See Dennis Blank, Surveillance Cameras Set to Keep
Watch in Airliners, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2002, at C1.
241 See Acting NTSB Chairman Jim Hall, Address at the
Global Airline Industry Program, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, at http://www.ntsb.gov/speeches/former/hall/
jhc001129.htm (Nov. 29, 2000).
242 Safety Recommendation Letter from Jim Hall, Chair-
man, NTSB to Jane Garvey, Administrator of the FAA (Apr.
11, 2000), at http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/letters/2000/
A0030_31.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2002) (detailing NTSB
safety recommendations A-00-30 and A-00-31) [hereinafter
Safety Recommendations A-00-30 and A-00-31).
243 See Investigators: All Signs Indicate Egypt Air Crash Was
other voice, presumably belonging to the captain
who had then returned from the lavatory, asked
" [W] hat's happening, Gamil? 248 . . . "What is this?
What is this? Did you shut the engine(s)?"2 49 The
Egyptian Government has rejected the intentional
crash theory as "unacceptable speculation.
'" 2 511
The NTSB concluded that the probable cause of
the accident was "the airplane's departure from
normal cruise flight, and subsequent impact with
the Atlantic Ocean as a result of the relief first of-
ficer's flight control inputs. The reason for the re-
lief first officer's actions was not determined."
25
Regardless of the crash's real cause, if a video
recorder had been present in the cockpit, the in-
vestigators may have enjoyed an easier investiga-
tion process that yielded results having a higher
degree of certainty. Accordingly, the NTSB rec-
ommended installing video recorders in cock-
pits. 25 2 This proposal is still being reviewed, and it
is likely to gain more attention in the post-Sep-
tember 1 1th world. If done properly, installation
of cockpit video recorders could provide a useful
tool for accident investigators. If not done prop-
erly, cockpit video recorders could provide an ir-
resistible target for the media and for litigators
who may be unable to resist exploiting these pow-
erful and tragic images.





246 See NTSB, VEHICLE RECORDERS DIVISION, SPECIALIST'S
FACTUAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION DCAOOMA006 (authored
by Albert G. Reitan) at 37, at http://www.ntsb.gov/events/
EA990/docket/Ex_12A.pdf (Feb. 10, 2000) (last visited Oct.
30, 2002) [hereinafter NTSB SPECIALIST's FACrUAL REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION, CVR TRANSCRIPT] (citing to a translated CVR
transcript, which states that the co-pilot of the Egypt Air
flight uttered, "I rely on God.").
247 See NTSB, AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BRIEF: EGYPTAIR FLIGHT
990, BOEING 7670366ER, SU-GAP, 60 Miles South of Nan-
tucket, Massachusetts, October 31, 1999, at 4, available at
http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2002/aab0201.htm (released
March 13, 2002) [herinafter NTSB, AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
BRIEF: EGYPTAIR FLIGHT 990].
248 See NTSB SPECIALIST'S FACTYUAL REPORT OF INVESTIGA-
TION, CVR TRANSCRIPT, suprfa note 246, at 37.
249 Id. at 38.
250 See BBC NEWS, Egypt Rejects Air Crash Report, at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/middle east/new-
sid_1287000/1287296.stm (Apr. 20, 2001) (last visited Oct.
30, 2002).
251 See NTSB, AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BRIEF: EGYPTAIR FLIGHT
990, supra note 247.





The original intent of placing CVRs aboard
commercial airplanes is clear. They are to be used
strictly for accident investigations. It is well-docu-
mented that CVRs have served the purpose of
helping to find the cause of aircraft accidents and,
thereby, helping to prevent reoccurrences. In ad-
dition, it has been well-documented that CVR
tapes have been misused on occasion. These
abuses have brought inexcusable grief to victims
and their families. It also has forced Congress to
further restrict access to tapes by invoking a
bright line rule of acceptable usage.
The content of the cockpit conversations is not
"privileged" from communication outside govern-
ment accident investigations, but the playing of
actual CVR tapes is, and must remain so. What
was said, and what happened are readily ascertain-
able from transcripts and other publicly available
data. It is not clear, then, that the narrow window
currently available for discovery of CVR audio is
of any justifiable use. As the Cali accident demon-
strated, content of CVR tapes still make their way
to the public, and the situation will likely worsen
if cockpit videotapes become the norm. Without
stringent restrictions, the public inevitably will
see, as well as hear pilots' dying moments-to the
glee of some, and the horror of others, including
the families of the pilots left behind. To prevent
what is otherwise inevitable, Congress and the
courts must continue to guard pilots' rights to pri-
vacy and their privileged communications in their
offices, the cockpits of the aircraft they fly.
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